8–10 Mar 2017
Spallation Neutron Source
US/Eastern timezone

2017 Charge

2017 SNS AAC Charge

March 8-10, 2017

Context:

Considerable progress has been made in the past year, but the operating schedule has been highly variable driven by two factors: assembly difficulties for the new Inner Reflector Plug (IRP-02), and predictable management of mercury target operation.  The delays in delivery of IRP-02 have now driven the long outage to begin at the end of CY 2017.  At this point continued operation of IRP-01 will be in question – the integrated exposure will have reached a level at which significant undesirable changes to the instrument neutron spectra are anticipated.  Furthermore, the existing IRP has developed a water leak that has to be managed for the entire calendar year.  Operational risk has increased significantly.

The necessity to delay the long outage has led to re-scheduling other initiatives such as AIP-34 (HVCM Controller Upgrades), AIP-35 (Warm Linac Vacuum Upgrade), plasma processing of additional cryomodules, instrument upgrades for which RAD resources are required, and obviously the installation of the spare RFQ in the SNS front-end.

The Beam Test Facility has been successfully commissioned, the spare RFQ tested to full operating power, and a program of physics measurements is actively underway.

The RAD Director has announced his planned retirement at the end of CY 2017.  The position has been advertised and candidates are being actively solicited.  He has requested that his replacement be on board by the end of August 2017 if at all possible to provide strong overlap for the management transition, which he desires should be effective on October 1, 2017.

The Proton Power Upgrade project has been very active.  A Director’s review of readiness for CD-1 was recently conducted, and project management is responding to recommendations from that review.

SNS has received the following Notable Outcome in the 2017 Performance Evaluation Management Plan (PEMP) for ORNL: “Accomplish SNS target design changes, with particular emphasis on He gas injection, to enable sustained and predictable operation at 1.4MW.”  The sponsor has recognized that the accelerator is no longer the sole barrier to sustained, reliable operation at 1.4 MW.

In December 2016 SNS management adopted a new operating rhythm of three outages and target changes per year beginning in CY 2017, and continuing through the estimated start of PPU tunnel installation in 2021.  This was done to respond to requests from the scientific staff to reduce the length of the running periods and to adopt a more pragmatic target management strategy.

Consequently, SNS accelerator and target-related activities over the next two years focus on two key objectives:

  1. By the end of FY 2018 achieve sustainable and predictable routine operation at or near 1.4 MW to the First Target Station (FTS) with availability against published schedule of ≥ 90% while using 3 target vessels per year.

  2. Enable success of the Proton Power Upgrade project by providing key technical and management resources as required to meet project objectives.

Charge:

  1. Do the capability and performance of the accelerator complex and neutron source support achieving Objective A?

  2. Is the Prioritization process and Project Planning strategy that has been developed and is in use for outage planning reasonable?

  3. Is the operating strategy with three outages per year reasonable?

  4. Is the scope of work and prioritization process for ongoing and future Accelerator Improvement Projects (AIP) appropriate and balanced between the competing interests building necessary margin for routine operation at 1.4 MW while addressing system obsolescence?

  5. Are non-AIP accelerator and beam delivery initiatives addressing issues of importance to present and future SNS operation?

  6. Is the Beam Test Facility being utilized effectively to address items of importance to present and future SNS operation?

  7. Are other test facilities (ISTS, CTF, RFTF, Modulators, etc.) being utilized effectively to address items of importance to present and future SNS operation?

  8. Is the SNS response to issues with the existing Inner Reflector Plug (IRP-01) and the IRP under construction (IRP-02) reasonable and adequate?Are there key lessons learned from the IRP-01 and IRP-02 experiences that should be considered in the design and fabrication of the next-generation IRP (IRP-03)?

  9. Is the SNS Target Management Plan a reasonable approach to improving both performance and understanding of SNS mercury targets?

  10. Is the strategy and schedule for deployment of gas injection in mercury targets reasonable?

  11. Are the SNS responses and ongoing actions to recommendations from the 2016 AAC meeting satisfactory?